Ikram Sehgal: Too Little Too Late
This "undermining" of the tribal system started in self appointed Field Marshal's time. Otherwise Ikram's assessment about the Army's incompetency is on the ball ~~t
By undermining the tribal system we weakened the fabric that gave tribals the strength to deal with the militants. Before venturing into FATA militarily Pakistan should have war-gamed the consequences and trained our troops in counter-insurgency. Since Musharraf had never seen combat in either 1965 or 1971, nor during his entire career, he favoured armchair generals over merit to sustain his rule, only a handful slipped through. Frontier warfare, or guerrilla warfare as taught in the Command and Staff College is outdated. This belated recognition has been at grievous human cost to the Pakistani Army. Air mobility and electronic capability that the Coalition in Afghanistan possesses is a critical necessity for us. We have this only partially. In this type of terrain it is virtually impossible to counter an insurgency without fully exploiting the heliborne potential. We must separate counter-insurgency from countering terrorism, even though there are strong linkages. We must also separate militancy from terrorism. What we need is a fully equipped force mandated to fight terrorism within the country. This Counter-Terrorism Force (CTF) must have its own personnel, equipment, mobility and intelligence potential thereof. CTF personnel must be drawn from the Armed Forces, LEAs, the customs, paramilitary forces, etc. The US could help us train and equip the proposed CTF. Our intelligence agencies should have coordinated their initiatives to ensure they are not at cross-purposes in intention or commitment about pursuing national objectives. Professionals should not be detracted by from their primary mission for personal and/or political objectives. As much as we cannot accept one-sided and motivated information from India as evidence, we cannot allow our territory to be used as a platform for adventurism of the terrorist kind.
By undermining the tribal system we weakened the fabric that gave tribals the strength to deal with the militants. Before venturing into FATA militarily Pakistan should have war-gamed the consequences and trained our troops in counter-insurgency. Since Musharraf had never seen combat in either 1965 or 1971, nor during his entire career, he favoured armchair generals over merit to sustain his rule, only a handful slipped through. Frontier warfare, or guerrilla warfare as taught in the Command and Staff College is outdated. This belated recognition has been at grievous human cost to the Pakistani Army. Air mobility and electronic capability that the Coalition in Afghanistan possesses is a critical necessity for us. We have this only partially. In this type of terrain it is virtually impossible to counter an insurgency without fully exploiting the heliborne potential. We must separate counter-insurgency from countering terrorism, even though there are strong linkages. We must also separate militancy from terrorism. What we need is a fully equipped force mandated to fight terrorism within the country. This Counter-Terrorism Force (CTF) must have its own personnel, equipment, mobility and intelligence potential thereof. CTF personnel must be drawn from the Armed Forces, LEAs, the customs, paramilitary forces, etc. The US could help us train and equip the proposed CTF. Our intelligence agencies should have coordinated their initiatives to ensure they are not at cross-purposes in intention or commitment about pursuing national objectives. Professionals should not be detracted by from their primary mission for personal and/or political objectives. As much as we cannot accept one-sided and motivated information from India as evidence, we cannot allow our territory to be used as a platform for adventurism of the terrorist kind.
posted by temporal at 2/12/2009
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